We study the gains from unilateral trade liberalization in the model with heterogeneous …rms and variable markups. We show that as in the models with CES preferences and constant markups, the e¤ect of liberalization depends on the use of the so-called "outside good"assumption and the type of trade barriers: In the presence of the outside good a fall in per unit trade costs reduces welfare at home, and raises it otherwise. Yet, if one considers a fall in import tari¤s instead of trade costs, even in the absence of the outside good protection is a desirable policy. Finally, we show that variable markups in our setting result in negative pro-competitive e¤ects, reducing gains from trade compared to those in the models with constant markups.
On the other hand, Edmond, Midrigan and Xu (forthcoming) and Arkolakis, Costinot, Donaldson and Rodriguez-Clare (2015) point out to the possibility of negative pro-competitive e¤ects of trade liberalization. The reason is that while trade liberalization leads to labor reallocation towards more productive …rms, i.e., exporters, these …rms could internalize the drop in trade costs and charge higher markups. As a result, whether trade liberalization leads to welfare gains or losses depends on a joint movement of labor reallocation and markup distribution.
Given the new insights from the recent trade literature on variable markups, what can we say about the desirable trade policies? Is full trade liberalization optimal or is there a need for some sort of protection? Does it matter what form trade liberalization takes, i.e., is there di¤erence between a reduction in import tari¤s and a fall in non-tari¤ trade barriers such as per unit trade costs? The main goal of this paper is to partially …ll the gap in the literature and provide tractable analytical results for the optimal trade policy in the two-country model of monopolistic competition with …rm heterogeneity and variable markups. As the base model for our analysis, we rely on the work by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) , a well-known extension of Melitz (2003) that incorporates endogenous markups by using the linear demand system with horizontal product di¤erentiation developed by Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) . As pointed out by Nocco, Ottaviano and Salto (2014) , who study the closed economy case of this model, endogenous markups create an additional within-sector misallocation: more productive …rms do not pass on their entire cost advantage to consumers by absorbing part of it in the markup and end up selling too small quantities compared to the optimal levels. The opposite happens with high cost producers, whose varieties end up being oversupplied.
Hence, variable markups in the presence of …rm heterogeneity result in misallocation distortion. A similar point is made by Dhingra and Morrow (2012) , who study allocation e¢ ciency in the case of separable preferences with variable elasticity of substitution. The natural question is what the e¤ect of unilateral trade liberalization is in the presence of such distortion.
The main prediction of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) is that a fall in per unit trade costs of foreign exporters reduces welfare of the liberalizing country, while raising welfare of its trading partner. However, the authors rely on the so-called "outside good" assumption, i.e., in addition to the Melitz (2003) type sector, they incorporate another one, usually called an "outside good" sector, that produces a homogenous good under perfect competition. It is freely traded, made oneto-one from labor in all countries, and used as numeraire. The use of the outside good assumption is very popular in many extensions of the Melitz (2003) model as well as in other works in trade literature. 7 One well-known advantage of this assumption is signi…cant simpli…cation of analytical derivations, since the outside good pins down wages across all countries exogenously. Its second advantage is the opportunity to study cross-sectoral ine¢ ciencies. Yet, such an assumption comes with a price. First, it excludes an important channel, through which trade a¤ects welfare, namely, an income e¤ect. Second, it adds an extra distortion to the model, since there is no markup in the outside good sector, whereas in the Melitz (2003) type sector producers charge prices above their marginal costs. As pointed out by Bhagwati (1971) , the presence of distortions can result in the breakdown of Pareto-optimality of laissez-faire. Hence, it is not surprising that the use of an outside good can potentially distort the impact of various changes on welfare.
In the …rst part of this paper, we demonstrate that this is exactly what happens in the case of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) . In particular, we show that once the "outside good" assumption is dropped from their model, the analysis can be carried out in a way similar to Demidova and Rodríguez-Clare (2013), i.e., one can use the help of a simple …gure that summarizes the key relationships in the model: the equilibrium results in two conditions that relate wage with the cost cuto¤ for domestic sellers in the Home economy. Using this …gure, it is straightforward to show that in the absence of the outside good, unilateral trade liberalization by Home is welfare-increasing for both the Home and Foreign economies. Moreover, we show that this result also holds in the case of a small Home economy, which we model in line with Demidova and Rodríguez-Clare (2009).
Next, we use the extension of the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model without an outside good to study a non-wasteful import tari¤, i.e., the one that generates tari¤ revenues. The reason we want to contrast import tari¤s with per unit trade costs is that in the case of the Melitz (2003) model with CES preferences and constant markups, the comparison of the results for trade costs (see Felbermayr and Jung, 2012 , and Demidova and Rodríguez-Clare, 2013) with the results for import tari¤s (see Rodríguez-Clare, 2009, and Larch, 2013) shows that the type of trade barriers matters: while full liberalization is optimal in the case of per unit trade costs, in the case of import tari¤s protection becomes an optimal policy for the Home government, whether the Home economy is modelled as a small or large one. The intuition behind these results is that in addition to the familiar terms of trade externality, imperfect competition together with …rm heterogeneity gives a rise to the markup and consumption-surplus distortions.
The former comes from the fact that there are markups charged by local producers, whereas prices of imported goods are equal to opportunity costs, which provides an argument in favor of trade 7 protection, since it reduces the markup distortion by shifting consumption towards domestic goods.
The second distortion arises because consumers at Home ignore the e¤ect of their spending on a number of imported Foreign varieties, which turns out to be below its optimal level. The implication of the second distortion is that trade liberalization becomes a desirable policy, since it helps to induce foreign producers' entry into the local market and increase the number of varieties they supply. The interplay between two distortions results in a positive value of the import tari¤ for both small and large Home economies, so that the markup distortion prevails.
Hence, the natural question is whether in our model with non-CES preferences the outcome of the analysis of imports tari¤s would be di¤erent from the one for per unit trade costs. We answer this question in the second part of the paper, where we derive the optimal values of import tari¤s for two cases of the small and large Home economies and show that, as in the case with CES preferences, protection is an optimal policy. In particular, a strictly positive import tari¤ maximizes welfare at Home, with the level of protection being higher in the case of a larger economy due to the terms of trade externality. Therefore, although the presence of variable markups creates an additional misallocation distortion, it does not outweigh the e¤ect of other distortions in the model and does not shift the policy choice from protection to full trade liberalization.
Given qualitative similarity of our policy results to those for the models with constant markups, what role then do the variable markups play, if any? In the last part of the paper we show that whether unilateral trade liberalization comes in form of falling trade costs or reductions in import tari¤s, the presence of variable markups results in the negative pro-competitive e¤ect. In the former case, a small fall in trade costs of foreign exporters causes labor at home to reallocate towards goods that are oversupplied, i.e., those that have a low markup, which, as pointed out by Arkolakis, Costinot, Donaldson and Rodriguez-Clare (2015), leads to smaller welfare gains. In the case of import tari¤s, we show that if the level of protection is low enough to begin with, its further reduction raises the average markup faced by consumers at home, which, as discussed by Edmond, Midrigan and Xu (forthcoming), implies smaller welfare gains as well. Thus, variable markups in our setting reduce potential gains from trade. 8 That is why it is not surprising to see that, as we 8 It is worth mentioning that the absence of pro-competitive gains in our model might be partially explained by the assumption about the cost distribution, which is speci…ed as Pareto. As a result of this assumption, a fall in trade costs, for example, leaves the local average markups as well as their dispersion una¤ected. Feenstra (2014) , who studies the model with non-CES preferences, shows that once the support of the distribution becomes bounded, other channels of pro-competitive gains from trade are back to work, a¤ecting the average markup as well as the markup dispersion. Also, the alternative way to bring pro-competitive e¤ects of trade back into the model would be show in the last part of the paper, the degree of intervention in our model is higher compared to that in the Melitz (2003) model with constant markups.
Related literature. Our results seem to be in line with Bagwell and Lee (2015) , who use the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model with the outside good to study the impact of import tari¤s and export subsidies in the case of two symmetric countries. Unlike Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) , they consider revenue-generating import tari¤s and, amongst other results, show that a marginal increase in the tari¤ imposed by the Home country raises welfare there at the cost of its trading partner. We see this paper as highly complimentary to ours with the main di¤erence between their and our results (other than asymmetric countries and non-marginal changes in the tari¤ levels in our model) being that Bagwell and Lee (2015) maintain the assumption of the outside good. It turns out that this di¤erence is important: Although it seems that welfare results in their model resemble ours, the mechanisms behind these results are not the same. For instance, their model generates a Metzler Paradox: as Home increases its import tari¤, its average price increases, while that abroad falls. This is not the case in our model, since both Home and Foreign averages prices rise together, meaning that the popular outside good assumption is not innocuous, and one has to be careful while interpreting the results obtained when it is used.
Another closely related to our work paper is Arkolakis, Costinot, Donaldson and Rodríguez-Clare (2015), who consider a large class of demand functions that generate variable markups in the setting with multiple countries. Their main …nding is that welfare implications of trade liberalization are similar to those in the models with constant markups, although variable markups tend to lower gains. The main di¤erence between their work and our setting is that we consider the non-separable quadratic utility function as well as the case of revenue-generating import tari¤s.
Hence, the results we get are complementary to theirs. Also, we provide analytical results for any change in trade costs: unlike marginal adjustments, large shifts in trade costs generate non-zero changes in the surplus associated with cuto¤ varieties. Given complexity of analytical derivations even in the case of symmetric fall in trade costs, to evaluate welfare gains from trade liberalization in the case of large changes, Arkolakis, Costinot, Donaldson and Rodríguez-Clare (2015) resort to simulations. The advantage of the graphical approach in our paper is that it allows to study these gains analytically.
Finally, another related work is by Spearot (2015) , who studies changes in revenue-generating an introduction of …xed production and exporting costs, which are absent in the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model as well as in our extension of their work. import tari¤s in the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model without the outside good assumption, which he further modi…es by incorporating multiple countries and multiple industries with heterogeneity in the country-by-industry shape parameters of the Pareto cost distributions. 9 Although the focus of Spearot (2015) is di¤erent from ours, his results for the case of unilateral trade liberalization seem to be supportive for our …ndings. In particular, after estimating the amended model empirically and running counterfactual experiments, he …nds that the US gains both from an increase in all its tari¤s by 10% and a removal of the observed tari¤s. One possible explanation is that the US tari¤s were set ine¢ ciently high to begin with. Another important …nding by Spearot (2015) is that the equilibrium and qualitative welfare e¤ects for the corresponding model with CES preferences are equivalent to those for his setting in the absence of shape variation. This result can be viewed as an additional support to our analysis that allows to conclude that welfare implications of unilateral trade liberalization are qualitatively the same in the settings with constant and variable markups.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 derives the equilibrium conditions for two cases of the large and small Home economies. Per unit trade costs and import tari¤s are introduced into the model and analyzed in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. The role of variable markups is studied in Section 5. Section 6 o¤ers concluding remarks.
The Model
In this Section we …rst modify the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model by dropping the outside good assumption, i.e., wages everywhere will be determined endogenously, and derive the equilibrium conditions for the case of two large economies. Then, we show how to modify these conditions for the small Home economy case.
Two Large Economies

Demand
There are two countries, Home and Foreign, of size L and L ; respectively. We will denote the Foreign country's parameters with asterisks. Wage in the Foreign country, w , is normalized to 9 Also, note that continuum quadratic preferences in Spearot (2015) are di¤erent from those in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and in our setting, since in Spearot (2015) the total industry quantity squared is excluded from the industrylevel sub-utility. unity. By dropping the outside good from the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model, 10 we get the following household's maximization problem with a non-separable quadratic utility function ( can be normalized to 1, but we keep it as it is to ease the comparison with Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008) :
where is the set of all available di¤erentiated good varieties. The degree of product di¤erentiation between varieties in the utility function above is characterized by : with lower varieties become closer substitutes, and in the limit case of = 0; consumers care only about the total amount they consume. From the F.O.C., we get
where is a Lagrangian multiplier. Denote the aggregate quantity of all varieties consumed by an
Using the same logic as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) , it can be shown that the set c of all varieties that are consumed (q c i > 0) is the largest subset of that satis…es:
where M is the measure of consumed varieties in c and p max = (1=M ) R i2 c p i di represents the choke price. Similarly, in the Foreign country
where Q = R q c (i) di is the aggregate quantity of all varieties consumed by a Foreign individual.
Production and Firm Behavior
Domestic Market. A …rm with marginal cost M C sells its variety i to L consumers. Hence, it sells q (i) = Lq c (i) and maximizes its pro…t, (i) = pq (i) M C (i) q (i) ; by choosing the appropriate 1 0 In Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), a household maximizes
where q c 0 is a consumption of the outside good. level of p (i) : Given (1), we get
There is a continuum of domestic …rms at Home that derive their unit labor costs from the Pareto cost distribution given by
Only …rms with positive demand will sell domestically. De…ne cuto¤ c D such that q (c D ) = 0 or, given wage w,
so that only …rms with c c D sell at Home. Using (1), we have
Similarly, we can de…ne the cuto¤ for Foreign domestic sellers, c D (their initial cost distribution
Given these cuto¤s and the fact that
L , we can rewrite the expressions for the Home and Foreign domestic sellers as:
where the last two lines above represent revenues and pro…ts, respectively. Note that as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), a …rm with a higher productivity (a lower cost) charges a lower price, makes higher sales, and earns higher pro…ts. Moreover, more productive …rms charge higher markups (a markup, m (c) p (c) =M C (c) ; rises with c). This gives a rise to misallocation distortion, since more productive …rms end up selling too little, while high cost producers tend to oversupply.
Exporting. The Foreign demand for the Home …rm's variety is given by
while for the exporting Foreign …rms we have
Then, given that Home and Foreign exporters face additional iceberg transportation costs of and , respectively, and using the same logic as before, we get
where c X and c X are the cost cuto¤s for Home and Foreign exporters, respectively, determined from q X (c X ) = 0 and q X (c X ) = 0. It can be shown directly that
Equilibrium Conditions
The free entry condition implies that the expected pro…ts from entering the market should be equal to the entry cost. Given the assumption of the Pareto cost distribution and (12), we can rewrite this condition for Home …rms as
where
Similarly, the free entry condition for Foreign …rms is
Next, let us look at the mass of active …rms at Home, M . Due to free entry, total pro…ts in the economy are zero, i.e., total revenues are equal to the labor payment:
where r D and r X are the expected revenues from domestic and export sales conditional on getting a cost draw below the corresponding cuto¤, given by
Similarly, the mass of active Foreign …rms is
Then the masses of entrants in each economy can be calculated as
Now let us derive the trade balance condition. It is given by
M are the masses of Home and Foreign exporters, respectively. Then, by using (12) and (18), we get
Finally, we need to derive the equations for and . As shown in Appendix A, they can be written as
We can use these expressions to exclude and from the set of equilibrium variables, so that in the equilibrium, we have 3 unknown variables, w; c D ; and c D ; that can be found from 3
conditions below: 11
As shown in Appendix A, welfare per capita at Home can be written as a function of a cost cuto¤ for domestic producers only:
It implies that welfare at Home rises with lower cost (higher productivity) of a marginal local seller. Similarly, welfare per capita in the Foreign country has the same formula as (21) with c D instead of c D :
Small Economy Case
In this Section we discuss the case of two countries, Home and Foreign, with Home being a "small The equilibrium derivations are similar to those in the case of two large economies with a few modi…cations discussed below. First, note that the derivations for Home …rms selling locally do not change. Next, let us look at exporting.
Home Exporting. "Small economy" assumption (i) implies that the Foreign demand for the Home …rm's variety is given by
where A and B are …xed constants. From the pro…t maximization problem of a Home exporter, we
where the marginal cost of an exporter is M C X (c) = w c: Then, we can de…ne the cost cuto¤ of a marginal exporter from q X (c X ) = 0;
1 2 See Appendix B for justi…cation of these three assumptions in our model. By using the same logic as before, we get the following expressions:
Foreign Exporting. "Small economy" assumption (ii) implies that active Foreign …rms have the following cost distribution:
; which is not a¤ected by changes at Home. Finally, "small economy" assumption (iii) states that the mass of active Foreign …rms, M ; is …xed, i.e., entry abroad is not not a¤ected by changes at Home as well. We normalize M to 1: Note that not all active Foreign …rms sell their goods in the Home market: only …rms with c c X become exporters, where, as before, c X = wc D = :
Equilibrium Conditions. The new free entry condition for Home …rms can be written as
where as before, Const 1 = 2 f e (k + 1) (k + 2) : Also, it is straightforward to show that, as before, M e is given by (18) . The new trade balance condition is given by
Finally, using the same logic as before, we can derive the expression for ; which is still given by (20) , and exclude it from the set of the equilibrium variables, so that we end up with only 2 equations for 2 unknown variables in the equilibrium, w and c D :
The formula for welfare per capita at Home is the same as before and is given by (21) . This completes the description of the model of a small Home economy.
Falling Trade Costs
In this Section we show that in our setting that does not incorporate an outside good assumption, welfare of a liberalizing country rises as it unilaterally reduces trade barriers to foreign …rms. Hence, the results of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) , who incorporate the outside good, are reversed. Proof. See Appendix C.
We can depict both relationships in Figure 1 , where the FE and TB curves represent the (FE) and (TB) conditions, respectively. 13 Intuitively, the FE curve is upward sloping, since high wage deters entry, letting less e¢ cient (high cost) …rms survive. The TB curve is downward sloping, since, to keep trade balance, high wage at Home must be compensated by higher e¢ ciency (lower cost) of Home …rms. The intersection of two curves gives the unique equilibrium values of w and c D . Moreover, it is straightforward to show that a reduction in inward variable trade barriers at Home, , a¤ects only the TB curve by shifting it down as shown in Figure 1 , which immediately 1 3 Note that our Figure 1 for the case of variable markups resembles the one in Demidova and Rodríguez-Clare (2013) for CES preferences. This is not a coincidence. We relate w and the cost cuto¤ for domestic sellers, cD;
while their graphical analysis relates w and the productivity cuto¤ for exporters, ' X . In the Melitz (2003) model the productivity cuto¤ for exporters is negatively related to the productivity cuto¤ for domestic sellers, which, in turn, is an inverse of the cost cuto¤. Hence, we have similar relationships between w and cD in our Figure 1 and w and ' X in Figure 1 in Demidova and Rodríguez-Clare (2013).
proves that both w and c D fall as falls. Also, from the (F E) condition in the case of a large Home economy, it can be shown directly that c D falls with falling w: Finally, recall that welfare in both economies falls with the cost cuto¤ for local producers there. Thus, we proved that: 4 Non-Wasteful Import Tari¤s
The Model
In this Section we consider a non-wasteful import tari¤. In particular, assume that if a Foreign …rm charges price p X ; then the Home government collects tari¤ revenues of (t 1) p X =t per unit sold, so that the Foreign …rm receives only p X =t. The question is whether charging t > 1 (i.e., a strictly positive tari¤) is a desirable policy for the Home government. In other words, we want to see how unilateral trade liberalization a¤ects welfare at Home, if the only policy instrument available to the Home government is an import tari¤ instead of per unit trade costs.
Our discussion begins with the derivations that are common for both the large and small Home economy cases. If the import tari¤ is non-wasteful, then the tari¤ revenues it generates, T; must be included into the Home national income. Hence, it becomes I = wL + T:
Then, the income per capita becomes I=L = w + (T =L) instead of just a labor payment, wage w: This means that all our derivations for Home consumers remain the same except for the new equation instead of (2):
Next, all derivations for Home producers do not change, which gives us the same (FE) condition as before (see (13) for the large economy case and (28) for the small economy case). The main change for the Foreign exporters is that while their goods are sold at p X in the Home market, i.e., the demand for their goods is de…ned from (p X ) = q X Q; the exporters collect only p X =t so that their pro…ts are X = (p X =t M C X ) q X : This gives the following cost cuto¤ for the marginal Foreign exporter:
so that the price set by the Foreign exporter with cost draw c is
All other expressions for Foreign exporters now include t as well :
From now on we will look at the large and small Home economy cases separately.
Large Home Economy Case. Given the changes above, the (F E) condition in the large Home economy case can be written as
where Const 1 is de…ned by (14) . Next, to derive the expression for the mass of active …rms at Home, let us look at the total expenditures at Home:
The (TB) condition implies that M x r x = M x r x : Then
i.e., total revenues earned by Home …rms are equal to labor payments at Home. This implies that our derivations for the masses of …rms at Home and abroad do not change, and as before, M e and M e are given by (18) .
Given the new formula for c X , the (TB) condition can be written as
The derivations for do not change: is still given by (20) . However, compared to (40) in Appendix A (where I=L = w), now we have:
where I=L 6 = w: Using the same logic as in Appendix A, 14 we get Q = I wL k+2 k+1 and
Note that if t = 1; then y = 0 so that we get the same equations as in the case of a wasteful tari¤ in Section 3. Using (33) Small Home Economy Case. As before, we do not have the (F E) condition in the small Home economy case, since Foreign entry is …xed. Also, using the same logic as in the case of the large Home economy, it can be shown that the expressions for the masses of …rms at Home do not change and given by (18) . Next, by using the new expression for c X , we can re-write the (TB) condition as Small Economy case:
where Const 2 is de…ned by (27) . Finally, we can derive the new expression for , which is again given by (33) with the main di¤erence being in the de…nition of y; where now M e = 1:
Welfare. In both cases of the large and small Home economy, the expression for welfare of the Foreign country does not change, but the expression for welfare at Home becomes more complicated.
See Appendix D for more details on it.
Optimal Non-Wasteful Import Tari¤s
We leave all the proofs for the cases of small and large Home economies to Appendices D and E, respectively. Here we provide the main results only. First, we have: 1 4 The only new derivation needed is for the national income per capita: Proposition 2 In the case of a small Home economy, there exists a unique import tari¤ that maximizes welfare there:
where k is the shape parameter of the Pareto cost distribution.
This result is in stark contrast to Proposition 1: full trade liberalization is no longer a preferable policy for the Home government even in the absence of the outside good sector, which means that whatever the distortions created by variable markups in addition to the markup and consumptionsurplus distortions present in the CES case, protection is needed to deal with them. We will discuss the role of variable markups in more details in Section 5. Meanwhile, note that the level of protection depends on the degree of …rm heterogeneity: lower k (higher …rm heterogeneity) results in higher need for protection, and when k ! 1; i.e., all …rms become identical, protection is no longer needed. The intuition is that if …rm dispersion is high, then even without a tari¤, only few low-cost …rms survive. This has two e¤ects on the desired policy: …rst, low-cost …rms charge higher markups so that the markup distortion at Home gets worse. Second, since only few Foreign …rms survive, the Home loss in imported variety due to the tari¤ becomes smaller. As a result, markup distortion outweighs the consumption-surplus one even more, so higher protection is needed. Now let us turn to the large Home economy case. We get the following result:
Proposition 3 In the case of a large Home economy, there exists a unique import tari¤ that maximizes welfare there. It can be found as a solution of the following equation:
where w is wage at Home.
The comparison of (36) and (37) reveals that the level of protection is higher for the large Home economy, which is not surprising due to the terms of trade externality that is captured by the last term: it depends on the relative market size, L=L , the relative productivity, (c M =c M ) k , and openness of the Home economy, k . Moreover, as L=L ! 0 (Home becomes the small economy), (37) converges to (36). Note that this result strongly resembles the one derived by Felbermayr, Jung and Larch (2013) for the case of constant markups, and as in their case, the analysis of the properties of t opt is complicated by the endogenous nature of wage w. 15 1 5 See (55) that implicitly de…nes w as a function of t; which allows for the comparative statics analysis of t opt :
The di¤erence between two types of trade barriers is also emphasized by Bagwell and Lee (2015) , who also show in the model of two symmetric countries that unlike an increase in trade costs studied in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) , a small increase in the import tari¤ imposed by the Home economy raises welfare there, while reducing welfare abroad. Moreover, such a change increases the average price at Home, while reducing that abroad, giving a rise to a Metzler paradox in their model.
However, the fact that the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model generates this paradox depends crucially on the assumption of the outside good. As we show in Appendix E, once this assumption is dropped, both Home and Foreign average prices rise with a higher import tari¤ so that a Metzler paradox disappears.
Given such similarity of the results in the models with constant and variable markups, the natural question then is what role variable markups play. We answer it in the next Section.
Unilateral Trade Liberalization and Markups
To begin, let us discuss a reduction in per unit trade costs. Even though the average local markup as well as the dispersion of local markups remain unchanged as falls, this does not mean that variable markups play no role as countries liberalize. In particular, as Edmond, Midrigan and Xu country j that produces variety w for market i, and a change in its labor share that is needed to produce this variety for market i :
where l (!; i) is the total employment associated with a production of variety ! in country j for sales in country i; 16 and ji is the set of all varieties produced in country j for country i: In other words, trade liberalization has a positive (negative) e¤ect on welfare in country j, if this covariance is positive (negative). The important property of the formula above is that it depends not only on the …rms'decisions in their local market, but also on their exporting decisions. In our model, the formula above can be rewritten as
As we show in Appendix F, for a small fall in , the expression above is negative. Hence, although unilateral trade liberalization is bene…cial for the Home economy as a whole, its gains are mitigated by the misallocation distortion that gets worse as starts to fall. 17 In other words, Another point we want to make in this Section is that there is an important di¤erence between a fall in per unit trade costs and an import tari¤. Unlike movements in trade costs that leave the aggregate markup unchanged, a non-wasteful import tari¤ has ability to a¤ect it. To avoid analytical di¢ culties, let us simplify the large economy case considered in Section 4 by imposing some symmetry on two countries, i.e., assume that L = L ; c M = c M ; = = 1: Then the 1 6 Note that (38) is obtained due to the fact that for any labor re-allocations, the size of the economy remains the same so that P 
As we show in Appendix F, when an import tari¤ t starts to rise from 1, the average markup falls. In other words, when the initial level of protection is small already, trade liberalization by Home in form of a falling import tari¤ actually increases the average markup faced by consumers there, which, according to Edmond, Midrigan and Xu (forthcoming), implies the negative procompetitive e¤ect. Hence, one has to be careful while extending the results derived for trade costs to the analysis of import tari¤s.
Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the implications of trade cost reductions and import tari¤s in the extension of the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model without the outside good. Our conclusions can be broadly summarized as follows. First, we …nd that in contrast to Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) , a reduction in per unit trade costs raises, and not reduces, welfare of the liberalizing country as well as welfare of its trading partner. Thus, the breakdown of optimality of laissez-faire in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) can be explained by the distortion created by the presence of the outside good sector. Second, we derive the optimal values of import tari¤s for the large and small Home economies and show that as in the models with monopolistic competition and CES preferences, protection is always a desirable policy for the Home government. The main di¤erence between the policy implications from the CES models and our setting is that the level of protection in our case is higher due to the negative pro-competitive e¤ect caused by variable markups.
Given the obtained results, there are several potential avenues for future research. First, as discussed in Introduction, it is possible that the absence of pro-competitive gains from trade in our model can be explained by the use of another popular assumption in literature on …rm heterogeneity, namely, cost distributions being speci…ed as Pareto. Thus, the natural question is how the deviation from this assumption will a¤ect our conclusions. Second, we derive our results in the two-country framework. It would be interesting to extend the analysis by incorporating multiple countries as done in Spearot (2015) , since in addition to producing potentially interesting third-country e¤ects, multiplicity of trading partners can reduce the negative e¤ect of variable markups by a¤ecting the level of absorption of the drop in trade costs by exporters. Finally, we have left Nash trade policies out of the scope of this paper. 18 The question is then if protection remains the optimal policy when all trading countries, and not just the Home economy, have the ability to choose their tari¤s. We leave all these questions to future work.
Thus, (40) can be re-written as w (c D Q 1) = w c D 1 k+2 Q; so that
Then from (2),
which we can solve for w :
Similarly,
Welfare From (41), per capita welfare at Home is given by
Per capita welfare in the Foreign country can be derived in a similar manner.
Appendix B: Justi…cation of Small Economy Assumption
Let us look at the equilibrium in the case of two countries considered in Section 2:
When L=L goes to 0, i.e., when Home becomes small relative to the Foreign country, we have
In other words, (c D ) k+2 is no longer a¤ected by changes in Home's variables. Then from ( ), c D and M t are not a¤ected as well, which justi…es assumptions (ii) and (iii) and equation (29) . We are left with 3 unknowns now, w, c D , and , and 3 equations,
Note that the demand for Home variety abroad is given by
where L c D and L are now constants. Let us denote them by A and B, respectively, so that q X (i) = A Bp X (i) ; as implied by assumption (i). Then we can rewrite (FE) as
which is exactly what we have as the (FE) condition given by (28) . Thus, we proved that our "small economy" assumptions follow directly from the case of two economies, when one of them becomes much smaller relative to the other one.
Appendix C: Proof of Lemma 1
Let us …rst look at the case of 2 large economies. Using the (FE) and (FE) ; we can re-write the (TB) condition as
In the case of a small economy (see (29) ) the RHS of the equation above becomes a constant, which implies the negative relationship between w and c D . We can prove that this is also true in the case of 2 large economies by re-writing the condition above as
Hence, in the case of 2 large economies, from the (TB) condition, w and c D are negatively related. Next, by using ( ) and ( ), we can re-write the (FE) condition given by (13) as
In the case of a small economy (see (28) 
which implies the positive relationship between w and c D : We can prove the same result for the case of 2 large economies, if we use the (FE) condition and re-write the equation above as
Appendix D: Non-Wasteful Import Tari¤ in Small Economy Welfare. Before deriving the optimal value of a non-wasteful import tari¤, let us discuss the formula for per capita welfare at Home. As shown in Appendix A, per capita welfare can be written as a function of Q (Q = R q c (i) di):
Note that we can no longer re-write it as a function of c D only, since as shown below, the expression for Q changes to include tari¤ revenues. This means that we need to study the behavior of U with respect to Q; which depends on whether
The restriction from the model is that Q > 0 (so that prices in the equilibrium are nonnegative). Since in any equilibrium it has to be the case that Q < = < (2k+3) (2k+2) ; then, as Q rises, per capita welfare at Home rises as well. Hence, in order to study the e¤ect of a tari¤ on welfare at Home, it is enough to look at the behavior of Q: As discussed in the main body of the paper, Let us re-write all the equilibrium conditions as functions of w; c D ; and z: In other words, instead of keeping track of ; we will look at z. First, we get
where 1) ) is a constant: We can use this equation in the (FE) and ( ) conditions to derive
where the constants are C 3 = 2 c k M f e (k + 1) (k + 2) =L; C 5 = B (A=B) k+2 k =L; and = C 4 (c M ) k = (2 (k + 2)) :
Note that the (FE) condition becomes very convenient, since it includes only one unknown w and the parameter t: We can apply the implicit function theorem to it to get:
Next, from the (FE) condition given by (46),
(51) and the second term in the nominator of z 0 is
Moreover, from (49) and (50), it can be shown directly that
Hence, the nominator of z 0 becomes 1 tr
This means that sign (z 0 ) = sign ((t 1) k 1) : Therefore, Lemma is proved. QED.
Recall that as z falls, welfare rises. Hence, we proved Proposition 2.
which has only one unknown w and parameter t: From the implicit function theorem, we get:
(56) Also, by applying the implicit function theorem to the (F E) condition, we get
Finally, from the (F E) condition, we have
After applying the implicit function theorem to the equation above, we get The …rst multipliers are positive so that to know the sign of z 0 ; we need to look at the last term in squared brackets that can be re-written as sign z 0 = sign Note that the (FE) condition can be written asr D +r X = wf e (k + 1) ; so that from (52), Note that the equation above still needs to be solved, since w is a function of t that is implicitly de…ned by (55). Given (56), w rises with t; meaning that the solution of the equation above is unique. Finally, recall that as z falls, welfare rises. Hence, we proved Proposition 3.
where the left-hand side is monotonically increasing in c D : From (53),
Given that w rises with t; the term in the squared brackets above falls, so that the multiplier in front of these brackets has to rise, meaning that c D rises too. Thus, we have d p dt = 2k + 1 2 (k + 1)
so that the average prices everywhere rise with an increase in t, implying no Metzler paradox in our model. Then, it can be shown straightforwardly that d m dt = 2k 1 2 (k 1) (t k+1 + tw k ) 2 (1 t) kw k 1 t k+1 dw dt w 2k kt k w k 1 + 1 k t :
Appendix F: Role of Variable Markups
When t starts to rise from 1 (consider t between 1 and 1 + 1 k ); w rises too (see (56)); so that for small increases in t we get d m dt < 0:
